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Abstract The attentional blink (AB) refers to the Wnding
that performance on the second of two targets (T1 and T2)
is impaired when the targets are presented at a target onset
asynchrony (TOA) of less than 500 ms. One account of the
AB assumes that the processing load of T1 leads to a loss of
top-down control over stimulus selection. The present study
tested this account by examining whether an endogenous
spatial cue that indicates the location of a following T2 can
facilitate T2 report even when the cue and T2 occur within
the time window of the AB. Results from three experiments
showed that endogenous cuing had a signiWcant eVect on
T2 report, both during and outside of the AB; this cuing
eVect was modulated by both the cue-target onset asyn-
chrony and by cue validity, while it was invariant to the
AB. These results suggest that top-down control over target
selection is not lost during the AB.
Introduction
When observers monitor a rapid serial visual presentation
(RSVP) of stimuli, such as letters, digits, words or pictures,
and search for two targets in the stream, they usually have
no diYculty in reporting the Wrst target (T1) but they show
a deWcit in reporting the second target (T2), if the T2
appears within less than 500 ms from T1 (Broadbent and
Broadbent 1987). The post-T1 interval during which report
of T2 is impaired is referred to as an attentional blink (AB,
Raymond et al. 1992).
During the last two decades, a number of models have
been proposed to account for the AB (e.g., Broadbent and
Broadbent 1987; Raymond et al. 1992; Shapiro et al. 1994;
Chun and Potter 1995; Giesbrecht and Di Lollo 1998; Jolic-
oeur and Dell’ Acqua 1998; Bowman and Wyble 2007;
Olivers 2007). Most of these models share the assumption
that the AB reXects the capacity limit of cognitive process-
ing, the idea being that the consumption of cognitive
resources in processing T1 causes the deWcit in T2 report.
Consistent with this interpretation, results from neuroimag-
ing studies show that there is considerable overlap between
the neural areas correlated with the AB bottleneck and
those implicated in the capacity limits of visual short-term
memory storage and in the phenomenon of psychological
refractory period, with all tasks showing increased activa-
tion of a fronto-parietal network under conditions of high
processing load (for an overview, see, Marois and IvanoV
2005).
In a recent study, Di Lollo et al. (2005) proposed an
account of how the processing load of T1 identiWcation
leads to the AB. According to this account, called the tem-
porary loss of control (TLC) model, the sensory system is
initially conWgured to be an input Wlter which is optimized
to process T1 and to exclude distractors. This conWguration
is assumed to be governed by the top-down signals from the
executive control system which is located in prefrontal cor-
tex (PFC). When T1 passes through the Wlter, the central
control system becomes engaged in processing T1 and the
top-down control signals are interrupted. At this time the
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which are now under the control of the properties of the
bottom-up input, resulting in diYculty in selecting T2
because the Wlter conWguration no longer matches the spec-
iWcations of T2. However, if the item following T1 is not a
distractor, but a target that belongs to the same category as
T1, the Wlter settings might not be changed, and this target
could be selected and processed without problem. Support-
ing evidence for TLC comes from Wndings showing that the
processing of T2 is not impaired when the items interven-
ing between T1 and T2 are from the same category as T1
and T2 (Di Lollo et al. 2005; Kawahara et al. 2006; Olivers
et al. 2007).
Although the AB has long been thought to be a conse-
quence of the depletion of processing resources by T1,
recent work suggests that there are in fact still processing
resources available during the AB. For example, it has been
shown that targets presented during the AB can in fact be
accurately identiWed when they are precued by a stimulus
that matches the attentional set for the targets (Nieuwen-
stein et al. 2005; Nieuwenstein 2006; see also, Olivers et al.
2007). Importantly, this cuing beneWt for T2 does not incur
a cost to T1 report, suggesting that not all resources are
consumed in processing the Wrst target. Work by Martens
and Johnson (2005) further suggests that these remaining
resources can be deployed in a purely endogenous fashion
during the AB. In particular, this study showed that the AB
is attenuated when observers are told on each trial what the
target-onset asynchrony (TOA) will be, suggesting that
they could somehow prepare for or deploy resources to the
moment at which T2 was expected to occur. Given that this
eVect occurred in the absence of an exogenous cue, it must
be concluded that resources were deployed on a voluntary
basis even during the AB.
The purpose of the present study was to conWrm and fur-
ther examine the extent to which observers maintain volun-
tary control over the deployment of processing resources
during the AB. To this end, we used an endogenous cuing
procedure to directly determine whether the function of
prefrontal control system is intact during the AB. In this
procedure, an arrow is presented in the center of the display
that can indicate where an upcoming target will appear
(e.g., Jonides 1981). Studies using arrow cues show that
whether or not observers voluntarily orient their attention
towards the cued location depends on the validity of the
cue, with stronger cuing eVects seen for highly predictive
cues than for cues with a low validity (e.g., Jonides 1980;
Posner 1980; Jonides 1983; Eriksen and Yeh 1985; Madden
1992; Riggio and Kirsner 1997). These results indicate that
this type of cuing is contingent on the observers’ intention
to use the cue, and, thus under top-down control. Moreover,
numerous neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that
endogenous attentional orienting involves a fronto-parietal
network (e.g., HopWnger et al. 2000; Miller 2000; Corbetta
and Shulman 2002; Miller and D’Esposito 2005; Praamstra
et al. 2005; Rounis et al. 2006) in which the PFC is consid-
ered the “top” of the top-down control system which can
modulate the activity of neurons in visual cortex indepen-
dent of input information (e.g., Miller 2000; Miller and
D’Esposito 2005). For example, a recent neuroimaging
study by Vossel et al. (2006) demonstrated more activation
in a fronto-parietal network for the endogenous cues with
high validity (90%) than that with low validity (60%).
These neural studies are congruent with LaBerge’s activity-
distribution model (e.g., LaBerge and Brown 1989;
LaBerge et al. 1997) of spatial attention, in which top-down
control processes of spatial attention, located in the dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), produce a selective
activity distribution in posterior parietal cortex (PPC) that
is enhanced through the thalamus to visual cortex. If the
function of top-down control over attention located in PFC
is temporally suspended during the period when T1 consol-
idation is underway, then the endogenous cuing eVect
would be impaired during the AB than outside of the AB
(as hypothesized by Ghorashi et al. 2007). On the contrary,
if the eVect of endogenous cuing is not aVected by the AB,
the presumption of loss-of-control should be re-considered.
An argument might be raised based on the presumption
that the diVerent parts of PFC are involved in diVerent
aspects of top-down attentional control. For example,
according to LaBerge (1997; see also LaBerge 2001), the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is selectively
involved in voluntary control of spatial attention (“where”
circuit), while the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC)
is involved in voluntary control of attention for shape and
color (“what” or “object” circuit). This entails that our mea-
sure of top-down controlled, spatial selection may not be
sensitive to the disturbance of the object-based Wltering
mechanisms implicated in the loss of control account. Cru-
cially, however, results from numerous recent neuroimag-
ing studies have provided evidence against LaBerges’s
claim in showing that the fronto-parietal network that is
recruited when subjects expect to see object or feature
clearly overlaps with regions that are recruited by attending
to location (for overviews, see Kanwisher and Wojciulik
2000; Corbetta and Shulman 2002; Yantis and Serences
2003; see also, Corbetta et al. 2005). A similar result was
obtained in an ERP study that showed that control of spatial
and non-spatial visual attention correlates with the same
neural activity (e.g., Slagter et al. 2005). Thus, the same
fronto-parietal network might be involved in the top-down
control over spatial attention in the present study and the
top-down control over input Wlter conWguration in TLC
model, and this provides fundament for our logic to test
whether this network loses its control function during the
AB.123
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the AB, we used the so-called “skeletal” two-target para-
digm (Duncan et al. 1994; Ward et al. 1996) in which T1
and T2, presented in one of four locations, are immediately
followed by pattern masks. A central arrow cue was
inserted between the target presentations. If the function of
top-down control is lost during the AB, the endogenous
attentional orienting would not work and consequently the
cuing eVect should be reduced or eliminated compared with
the cuing eVect when the cue is presented outside of the AB
period. If, on the other hand, the functioning of the prefron-
tal control system is intact during the AB, the cuing eVects
should be present both inside and outside of the AB.
Given that cue validity plays a signiWcant role in modu-
lating the size of endogenous cuing eVects in spatial orient-
ing (e.g., Jonides 1980, 1983; Posner 1980; Eriksen and
Yeh 1985; Madden 1992; Riggio and Kirsner 1997; Vossel
et al. 2006), we manipulated the cue validity of the central
cue, both inside and outside the AB period, across three
experiments. In Experiment 1, we used a cue validity of
100% to test whether the central cuing works in the AB
context. Then, in Experiment 2, we used a cue validity of
50% to demonstrate that the observers could ignore unin-
formative cues both inside and outside of the AB. In Exper-
iment 3, the cue validity was 80%, thereby allowing for an
assessment of the eVects of both valid and invalid cues
under condition in which the cue is expected to be valid.
An additional purpose of Experiment 2 (with a cue valid-
ity of 50%) was to conWrm that any eVects of the arrow cue
were indeed due to an endogenous shift of attention. As
previous work suggests, there are cases in which symbolic
cues such as eye gazes or arrows have been found to direct
attention in exogenous manner (e.g., Hommel et al. 2001;
Ristic et al. 2002). The hallmark of this exogenous compo-
nent to orienting attention in response to a symbolic cue is
that target performance is enhanced even when the cues are
non-predictive (i.e., 50% validity). Consequently, if there
were to be an exogenous component to orienting in
response to the arrow cue we used, the results from Experi-
ment 2 would reveal this, as in this experiment, the cue
validity was 50%.
Experiments 1–3
Method
Participants
Sixty right-handed students (30 males and 30 females) from
Peking University were recruited to participate in the
experiments in return for monetary compensation. Their
age ranged from 20 to 28, and averaged on 22 § 3.5 years.
All the participants reported having normal or corrected-to-
normal eyesight. They were randomly assigned to the three
experiments, with 10 males and 10 females for each experi-
ment.
Apparatus and stimuli
The experiments were run in a dimly illuminated room,
with stimuli presented on a 17” CRT monitor running at a
resolution of 1,024 £ 768 pixels. Stimulus presentation and
recording of participants’ responses were controlled by Pre-
sentation software (http://nbs.neuro-bs.com/). The stimulus
display consisted of a white central Wxation cross [with the
RGB values (255, 255, 255)] that was surrounded by four
grey outline frames or place-holders [with the RGB values
(125, 125, 125)] that designated the potential target loca-
tions (see Fig. 1). The size of Wxation was 0.6 £ 0.6 of
visual angle. The distance between the Wxation cross and
the center of each of these four place-holders was 2.0° of
visual angle. A chinrest was set at 57 cm from the screen.
The two targets were randomly drawn from the upper-case
letter set [K, M, N, V, W, X, Y, Z] and the mask consisted
of two hashmarks next to each other (i.e., “##”; cf. Nieu-
wenstein et al. 2005). Targets and masks were presented in
the Times New Roman font, in white [with the RGB values
(255, 255, 255)] against dark background (0, 0, 0), and in a
size of 0.3° £ 0.4° of visual angle. The central cue, sub-
tending 1° in visual angle, was a white arrow [255, 255,
255] presented at the Wxation position and pointed to the
left or right place-holder.
Design and procedures
Half of the trials in each of the experiments had the central
cue. The onset asynchrony (TOA) between T1 and T2 had
two levels, 360 and 720 ms. When a trial had the central
cue, the interval separating the onset of the cue from that of
T2, the cue-target onset asynchrony (CTOA), was 90, 180,
or 270 ms. In Experiment 1, the cue validity was 100%.
That is, when present, the cue always indicated correctly
the location of the upcoming T2. In Experiment 2, the cue
validity was 50%, so T2 only appeared in the cued location
on half of the trials. The cue was valid on 80% of the trials
in Experiment 3.
Participants began each trial by pressing the space bar
while Wxating on the central cross in the Wxation display.
After 1 s, the Wrst target (T1) was presented for 52 ms either
above or below the central Wxation and followed immedi-
ately by the mask which appeared at the T1 location for
38 ms. Following an interval of 270 or 630 ms (for TOAs of
360 and 720 ms, respectively), T2 appeared for 52 ms to the
left or right of the Wxation cross. Like T1, T2 was followed
by a mask which was presented in the same location as T2123
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left or the right location was presented for 40 ms at the loca-
tion of the Wxation cross. Depending on the CTOA, this
arrow could appear at diVerent points in time from T1. For
example, when the TOA was 360 ms and the CTOA was
270 ms, the cue appeared immediately following the oVset
of the T1 mask. The task for the participants was to report
the identities of T1 and T2 in their presentation order. If
both T1 and T2 were reported as right identities but in
reversal order, they were marked as correct report.
In Experiment 1, there were 40 trials for each combina-
tion of CTOA and TOA in the cued condition, and there
were 120 trials for each TOA in the uncued condition. Thus
Experiment 1 consisted of 480 trials. These trials were
divided into Wve testing blocks, with each block containing
96 trials. In Experiment 2, there were 40 cued trials for each
combination of CTOA, cue validity and TOA, and 240
uncued trials for each TOA. Therefore, Experiment 2 had
960 trials which were divided into 10 testing blocks. In
Experiment 3, there were 36 invalid cue trials and 144 valid
cue trials for each combination of CTOA and TOA, and
540 uncued trials for each TOA, yielding a total of 2,160
trials. This experiment was conducted in three separate ses-
sions, each conducted on a diVerent day in the same week.
Each session had six testing blocks with 120 trials in each
block. Trials from diVerent experimental conditions were
equally distributed into diVerent testing blocks and there
was an interval of 1–2 min between the blocks. Participants
received 60 practice trials before they began the experi-
ment.
Participants were instructed to maintain Wxation on the
central cross and to try to avoid making eye movements
during a trial. They reported the targets by typing them in
the order of appearance at the end of each trial. They were
also informed of the validity of the cue before they began
the experiment.
Results
The average performance for report of T1 was 92, 90 and
92% for Experiments 1, 2 and 3, respectively (for the accu-
racy and standard error for each condition, see Table 1).
There were no main eVects or interactions of the factors
cuing and TOA on T1 accuracy (P > 0.1). Data analyses
were then conducted on T2-identiWcation performance.
These analyses only included trials in which T1 was cor-
rectly reported (i.e., T2|T1). Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the
means and standard errors for accuracy of T2|T1 in diVer-
ent experimental conditions from Experiments 1–3.
Experiment 1: 100% cue validity
Mean accuracy scores for T2|T1 were entered into a 2
(TOA) £ 4 (cue condition: uncued, and cues with CTOA of
90, 180, 270 ms) ANOVA. The main eVect of TOA was
signiWcant, F (1, 19) = 133.34, P < 0.001, with better T2
report at the long TOA than that at the short TOA (85 versus
63% correct). The main eVect of cue condition was signiW-
cant, F (3, 57) = 41.91, P < 0.001, with the lowest accuracy
for the CTOA of 90 ms (mean = 67%), the highest accuracy
for the CTOA of 270 ms (mean = 82%), and intermediate
levels of performance for the uncued condition
(mean = 73%), and the cued condition with an CTOA of
Fig. 1 A schematic representa-
tion of the trial procedure for 
Experiments 1–3123
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mance in the four cue conditions showed that each of these
diVerences was signiWcant at an alpha corrected for multiple
comparisons using Bonferroni adjustment (all
P’s < 0.0083). These results indicate that, compared to the
uncued condition, T2 performance was enhanced in the
cued condition when the CTOA was 180 or 270 ms, while it
was relatively impaired for cued trials with a CTOA of
90 ms. Importantly, the interaction between TOA and cue
condition was not signiWcant, F (3, 57) = 1.92, P > 0.1, indi-
cating that the central cues inXuenced T2 performance to the
same extent however short or long the TOA was. Thus,
endogenous cuing did not appear to be aVected by the AB.
Experiment 2: 50% cue validity
We performed separate analyses for the eVects of valid and
invalid cues in Experiment 2.
EVects of valid cues
A 2 (TOA) £ 4 (cue condition: uncued, and cues with
CTOA of 90, 180, and 270 ms) ANOVA was conducted
for T2|T1 in the uncued and valid cuing conditions of
Table 1 Means and standard errors of T1 accuracy (in %) from Exper-
iments 1–3
M mean, SE standard errors
CTOA (ms) TOA = 360 ms TOA = 720 ms
M (%) SE (%) M (%) SE (%)
Experiment 1 (100% valid)
Uncued 92 0.9 92 1.3
Valid 90 90 1.8 90 1.5
180 90 1.3 91 1.4
270 91 1.9 92 1.0
Experiment 2 (50% valid)
Uncued 91 1.7 91 1.9
Valid 90 92 1.8 90 1.9
180 90 1.8 91 1.9
270 90 2.0 89 2.1
Invalid 90 90 2.2 90 2.0
180 92 1.6 90 2.5
270 91 1.6 92 1.6
Experiment 3 (80% valid)
Uncued 91 1.5 92 1.5
Valid 90 91 1.7 91 1.5
180 91 1.6 91 1.6
270 91 1.8 91 1.6
Invalid 90 91 1.6 91 1.7
180 90 1.9 91 2.1
270 90 2.2 91 1.5
Fig. 2 T2|T1 accuracies from Experiment 1. The error bar indicates
the standard error for each condition
Fig. 3 T2|T1 accuracies from Experiment 2. The error bar indicates
the standard error for each condition
Fig. 4 T2|T1 accuracies from Experiment 3. The error bar indicates
the standard error for each condition123
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F (1, 19) = 171.63, P < 0.001, with lower accuracy for T2
identiWcation at the short TOA (mean = 63%) than at the
long TOA (mean = 83%). The main eVect of cue condition
approached signiWcance, F (3, 57) = 2.39, P = 0.078. Bon-
ferroni-corrected pair-wise comparisons revealed that none
of the pair-wise diVerences between T2 reporting in diVer-
ent cue conditions reached signiWcance. Moreover, the
interaction between TOA and cue condition was not signiW-
cant, F (3, 57) < 1. Thus, in contrast to Experiment 1, there
were no signiWcant eVects of valid central cues.
EVects of invalid cues
The comparison of T2|T1 for the uncued condition and the
condition with invalid cues showed a signiWcant main eVect
of TOA, F (1, 19) = 335.87, P < 0.001, with lower accu-
racy at the short TOA (mean = 63%) than at the long TOA
(mean = 82%). The main eVect of cue condition
approached signiWcance, F (3, 57) = 2.46, P = 0.072, but
pair-wise comparisons revealed no signiWcant diVerences
between the four conditions. The interaction between TOA
and cue condition approached signiWcance, F (3,
57) = 2.69, P = 0.055. Further analyses showed that the
main eVect of cue condition approached signiWcance at the
short TOA, F (3,57) = 2.74, P = 0.052. At the long TOA,
the main eVect of cue condition also approached signiW-
cance, F (3, 57) = 2.28, P = 0.089. The Bonferroni-cor-
rected pair-wise comparisons showed that only the
diVerence between invalid cues with the 90 and the 180 ms
CTOA was signiWcant, P < .0083. These results suggest
that, relative to the uncued condition, the invalid cues did
not aVect T2 performance.
Experiment 3: 80% cue validity
EVects of valid cues
The T2|T1 accuracy for the valid cue and the uncued condi-
tions were entered into a 2 (TOA) £ 4 (cue condition:
uncued, and cues with CTOA of 90, 180, and 270 ms)
ANOVA. The main eVect of TOA was signiWcant, F (1,
19) = 80.07, P < 0.001, with lower T2 performance at the
short TOA (mean = 60%) than at the long TOA
(mean = 72%). The main eVect of cue condition was sig-
niWcant, F (3, 57) = 20.70, P < 0.001, with the highest
accuracy at the 270 ms CTOA (mean = 69%), the lowest
performance at the 90 ms CTOA (mean = 62%), and an
intermediate level of performance for the uncued condition
(mean = 66%) and the 180 ms CTOA (mean = 66%) condi-
tion. Each of the pair-wise diVerences between the diVerent
cue conditions was signiWcant, P < 0.0083, except for the
diVerence between the uncued condition and the 180 ms
CTOA condition, P > 0.1. The interaction between TOA
and cue condition was not signiWcant, F (3, 57) = 1.16,
P > 0.1, indicating that the pattern of cuing eVects was the
same at the short and the long TOAs.
EVects of Invalid Cues
The analyses of T2|T1 for trials with invalid cues revealed a
signiWcant main eVect of TOA, F (1, 19) = 115.61,
P < 0.001, with lower T2 performance at the short TOA
(mean = 55%) than at the long TOA (mean = 68%). The
main eVect of cue condition was signiWcant, F (3,
57) = 8.76, P < 0.001, with the highest T2 accuracy for the
uncued condition (mean = 66%), the lowest T2 accuracy
for the 270 ms CTOA (mean = 59%), and medium perfor-
mance for the 180 ms CTOA (mean = 60%) and the 90 ms
CTOA (mean = 62%). Bonferroni-corrected pair-wise com-
parisons showed that all pair-wise diVerences between the
uncued condition and the conditions with invalid cues were
signiWcant (P < 0.0083) except for the diVerence between
the uncued condition and the 90 ms CTOA condition,
which approached signiWcance (P = 0.06). There were no
signiWcant diVerences between the three conditions with
invalid cues, all P’s > 0.1. The interaction between TOA
and cue condition was not signiWcant, F (3, 57) < 1.
General discussion
The aim of the present study was to determine if and how
the capacity to endogenously orient spatial attention is
aVected by the AB. To this end, we examined the eVects of
arrow cues on the ability to report a second target that
appeared during or after the AB induced by a leading Wrst
target. The arrow indicated the location where T2 could
appear. The validity of the cue was varied across three
experiments, with 100% valid cues in Experiment 1, 50%
valid cues in Experiment 2 and 80% valid cues in Experi-
ment 3.
Results from the three experiments can be summarized
as follows. An AB was observed in each experiment, with
T2 report being worse when the time interval between T1
and T2 was short (360 ms) than when the interval was long
(720 ms). The eVects of valid and invalid cues on T2 per-
formance were modest, yet they appeared to be systematic.
Valid cues led to better performance on T2 when the time
interval between the cue and T2 was relatively long (i.e.,
with CTOAs of 180 or 270 ms) but only in Experiments 1
and 3 where cues were 100 and 80% valid, respectively.
Invalid cues, in contrast, led to worse performance for
reporting T2 in Experiment 3 where the cue was expected
to be valid. For trials with a CTOA of 90 ms, both valid and
invalid cues produced a decrement in T2 report, perhaps123
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location and observers needed some time to reorient atten-
tion from the location of the cue towards the cued location.
Critically, the cuing eVects observed with the two longer
CTOAs in Experiments 1 and 3 were not observed when
the cue was uninformative with regard to the T2 location
(i.e., in Experiment 2 where 50% of the cues were valid),
thereby excluding the possibility that the cuing eVects
observed in Experiments 1 and 3 were due to some reXex-
ive attentional orienting mechanism evoked by the shape of
arrow cue (e.g., Hommel et al. 2001; Ristic et al. 2002).
Finally, and, most importantly, the observed pattern of
cuing eVects did not interact with TOA, suggesting that the
AB did not aVect the processes involved in endogenous
control of spatial selective attention.
A drawback to the interpretation of the present Wndings
is perhaps that our answer to the main question of inter-
est—whether the AB aVects endogenous spatial cuing—is
based on a null-eVect, namely, the lack of interaction
between cuing and TOA. To further strengthen the case that
endogenous cuing was not aVected by the AB we ran an
additional analysis on the data collapsed for the 180 and
270 ms CTOA conditions from experiments 1 and 3. In
spite of increased statistical power, the interaction of cuing
and TOA remained non-signiWcant in this analysis,
strengthening our conWdence in the conclusion that the AB
appears to have little impact on processes involved in the
endogenous orienting of spatial attention.
The inhibitory cuing eVect for predictive valid cues with
90 ms of CTOA in Experiment 1 and 3 suggests that it takes
a certain amount of time to process an endogenous cue and
to shift attention accordingly. Meanwhile, the result that the
facilitatory cuing eVects for predictive valid cues grew with
increasing CTOA (i.e., 180 and 270 ms) is consistent with
previous studies showing that it takes time to build up
endogenous control over spatial orienting (e.g., Müller and
Rabbitt 1989). In the present study, there seems a confound-
ing linkage between CTOA and T1-cue SOA. If the pro-
cessing of T1 and the cue compete for the same resources
and if T1 processing consumes most of these resources,
then the shorter T1-cue SOA, the stronger the competition
between T1 and the cue, the less processing of the cue, and
consequently the weaker the endogenous cuing eVects. The
question is then whether the potentially growing cuing
eVect with increasing T1-cue SOA is counteracted by the
decreasing CTOA. Due to the nature of AB paradigm, it
was not possible to manipulate T1-cue SOA and CTOA
independently without aVecting TOA in this study. How-
ever, this linkage is not a problem for the present study. For
the trials with a long TOA, the T1-cue SOA was at least
450 ms, putting all the cues near the end of the typical AB
period. For the trials with short TOA, the T1-cue SOA
ranged from 90 to 270 ms, putting all the cues within typi-
cal AB period. If the processing of T1 and the cue competes
for the same resources, either T1 performance or the cuing
eVect would be diVerent between the short and the long
TOA trials. However, the results showed that T1 perfor-
mance did not change over the short and the long TOA tri-
als; the impact of CTOA upon T2 performance did not vary
over the short and the long TOA trials either, indicating that
the T1-cue SOA had little impact upon the pattern of cuing
eVects. This is the key point of the present study: endoge-
nous cuing is not inXuenced by T1 processing.
In showing that the endogenous orienting of spatial
attention is unaVected by an AB, the present Wndings com-
plement previous studies in which it was shown that selec-
tion based on category, color (Nieuwenstein 2006), or the
expected moment of arrival of a second target (Martens and
Johnson 2005) all continue to operate according to top-
down goals during the AB. Together, these results make a
compelling case against the loss-of-control account which
assumes that the AB occurs because the Wlter (template)
used for target selection is no longer eVective due to the
load imposed by encoding T1 (Di Lollo et al. 2005; Kawa-
hara et al. 2006). Instead, the available Wndings converge in
suggesting that top-down control over visual selection is
sustained during the AB.
While selection thus continues to adhere to top-down
goals during an AB, this is not to say that selection operates
eVectively during this period (e.g., Jiang and Chun 2001;
Vul et al. 2007). This is indicated by the fact that errors in
report of targets presented during the blink are mostly due
to failures of timely selection: Observers will often report
the item trailing T2 instead of T2 (Chun 1997; Isaak et al.
1999), and precuing T2 with a stimulus that matches one of
the target-deWning features substantially reduces the blink
eVect (Nieuwenstein et al. 2005; Nieuwenstein 2006). For
example, in an experiment that used the same method as
that used in the present experiments, Nieuwenstein et al.
(Experiment 4) found that when T2 is preceded by an exog-
enous cue (a plus sign that appeared 94 ms prior to T2, in
the same location as T2) there is a substantial improvement
in T2 report during the blink, but not outside of the blink
(but see Ghorashi et al. 2007). This Wnding was taken to
indicate that there is a delay between the detection of a
potential target stimulus and the allocation of resources that
are needed to sustain the target representation and to con-
solidate it into short-term memory. Thus, although the AB
does not prevent attention from being triggered selectively
by stimuli that match our top-down goals, it does aVect the
rate at which resources are deployed when a potential target
stimulus is detected.
The notion that resource allocation is delayed during an
AB seems at odds with the present Wndings that show that
the time course of the deployment of attention in response
to an endogenous cue is similar during and outside of the123
294 Exp Brain Res (2008) 185:287–295blink period. However, this inconsistency may be explained
if one assumes that diVerent mechanisms are involved in
endogenous spatial orienting and in the allocation of
resources in response to a potential target. As argued by
LaBerge and Brown (1989) (see also LaBerge et al. 1997;
LaBerge 2001), endogenous orienting of attention may
involve a slow build up of attentional resources at the loca-
tion where a target is expected to appear. This state of pre-
paratory attention may encompass one or multiple locations
depending on top-down goals (e.g., JeVeries et al. 2007)
and it can be conceived of as a gradient of attention-related
activity across the visual Weld. When a (potential) target
appears, a diVerent type of attentional response is elicited.
This response is focal, transient, and intense, and therefore
capable of facilitating identiWcation of targets that are
brieXy presented and masked (Nakayama and Mackeben
1989). Crucially, it is this form of transient attention that
has been implicated in explanations of the AB (Nie-
uwenhuis et al. 2005; Bowman and Wyble 2007; Olivers
2007). In particular, it is thought that target detection
invokes transient attention, thereby beneWting the encoding
of items that appear within a window of about 100 ms fol-
lowing the onset of the target (this explains the so-called
“sparing” of T2 identiWcation seen when T2 follows T1 at
TOAs of less than 100 ms. see Potter et al. 1998). More
important, this transient form of attention is also considered
to be the locus of the selection delays seen for targets pre-
sented during the AB. For example, one proposal is that
consolidating T1 into short-term memory inhibits the
mechanism that mediates transient attention so as to ensure
that no new inputs can intrude and interfere with the ongo-
ing processing of T1 (B. Wyble et al., submitted). In this
view, the delayed engagement of attention during an AB
reXects the fact that more time (and target input) is needed
to overcome this inhibition so that a second episode of tran-
sient attention can be launched.
Thus, transient attention appears to constitute a critical
part of the mechanism that gives rise to delayed selection in
the AB. On the other hand, the processes that implement
top-down goals through setting the weights for diVerent
features or locations appear to be unaVected by the process-
ing demands of encoding T1 into short-term memory.
In conclusion, the present Wndings show that the pro-
cesses underlying the voluntary deployment of attention to
a particular location are not aVected by the AB. In this
regard, the present study corroborates previous work that
also provided evidence consistent with the possibility that
top-down control over resource allocation and stimulus
selection is not lost during the AB (e.g., Martens and John-
son 2005; Nieuwenstein et al. 2005; Nieuwenstein 2006).
Together, these results make a compelling case against the
claim that the processing load of T1 identiWcation leads to a
temporary loss of top-down control over selective attention
(Di Lollo et al. 2005; Kawahara et al. 2006).
Acknowledgments This study was supported by grants from the
Natural Science Foundation of China (30470569, 60435010, and
30770712). We thank two anonymous reviewers for their constructive
comments on the earlier versions of the paper. Electronic mail concern-
ing this study should be addressed to Dr. Xiaolin Zhou
(xz104@pku.edu.cn).
References
Bowman H, Wyble B (2007) The simultaneous type, serial token mod-
el of temporal attention and working memory. Psychol Rev
114:38–70
Broadbent DE, Broadbent MHP (1987) From From detection to iden-
tiWcation—response to multiple targets in rapid serial visual pre-
sentation. Percept Psychophys 42:105–113
Chun MM (1997) Temporal binding errors are redistributed by the
attentional blink. Percept Psychophys 59:1191–1199
Chun MM, Potter MC (1995) A two-stage model for multiple target
detection in rapid serial visual presentation. J Exp Psychol Hum
Percept Perform 21:109–127
Corbetta M, Shulman GL (2002) Control of goal-directed and stimu-
lus-driven attention in the brain. Nat Rev Neurosci 3:201–215
Corbetta M, Tansy AP, Stanley CM, AstaWev SV, Snyder AZ, Shul-
man GL (2005) A functional MRI study of preparatory signals for
spatial location and objects. Neuropsychologia 43:2041–2056
Di Lollo V, Kawahara J, Ghorashi SMS, Enns JT (2005) The atten-
tional blink: resource depletion or temporary loss of control? Psy-
chol Res-Psychol Forsch 69:191–200
Duncan J, Ward R, Shapiro K (1994) Direct measurement of atten-
tional dwell time in human vision. Nature 369:313–315
Eriksen CW, Yeh YY (1985) Allocation of attention in the visual-Weld.
J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 11:583–597
Ghorashi SMS, Di Lollo V, Klein RM (2007) Attentional orienting in
response to peripheral cues survives the attentional blink. Vis
Cogn 15:87–90
Giesbrecht B, Di Lollo V (1998) Beyond the attentional blink: visual
masking by object substitution. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Per-
form 24:1454–1466
Hommel B, Pratt J, Colzato L, Godijn R (2001) Symbolic control of vi-
sual attention. Psychol Sci 12:360–365
HopWnger JB, Buonocore MH, Mangun GR (2000) The neural mech-
anisms of top-down attentional control. Nat Neurosci 3:284–291
Isaak MI, Shapiro KL, Martin J (1999) The attentional blink reXects re-
trieval competition among multiple rapid serial visual presenta-
tion items: tests of an interference model. J Exp Psychol Hum
Percept Perform 25:1774–1792
JeVeries LN, Ghorashi SM, Kawahara J, Di Lollo V (2007) Ignorance
is bliss: the role of observer expectation in dynamic spatial tuning
of the attentional focus. Percep Psychophys (in press)
Jiang YH, Chun MM (2001) The inXuence of temporal selection on
spatial selection and distractor interference: an attentional blink
study. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 27:664–679
Jolicoeur P, Dell’ Acqua R (1998) The demonstration of short-term
consolidation. Cognit Psychol 36:138–202
Jonides J (1980) Towards a model of the minds eyes movement. Can J
Psychol 34:103–112 (Revue Canadienne De Psychologie)
Jonides J (1981) Voluntary versus automatic control over the mind’s
eye’s movement. In: Long JB, Baddeley AD (eds) Attention and
performance IX. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, pp 187–203123
Exp Brain Res (2008) 185:287–295 295Jonides J (1983) Further toward a model of the minds eyes movement.
Bull Psychon Soc 21:247–250
Kanwisher N, Wojciulik E (2000) Visual attention: insights from brain
imaging. Nat Rev Neurosci 1:91–100
Kawahara JI, Kumada T, Di Lollo V (2006) The attentional blink is
governed by a temporary loss of control. Psychon Bull Rev
13:886–890
LaBerge D (1997) Attention, awareness, and the triangular circuit.
Conscious Cogn 6:149–181
LaBerge D (2001) Attention, consciousness, and electrical wave activ-
ity within the cortical column. Int J Psychophysiol 43:5–24
LaBerge D, Brown V (1989) Theory of attentional operations in shape
identiWcation. Psychol Rev 96:101–124
LaBerge D, Carlson RL, Williams JK, Bunney BG (1997) Shifting
attention in visual space: tests of moving-spotlight models versus
an activity-distribution model. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Per-
form 23:1380–1392
Madden DJ (1992) Selective Selective attention and visual-search—
revision of an allocation model and application to age-diVerences.
J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 18:821–836
Marois R, IvanoV J (2005) Capacity limits of information processing
in the brain. Trends Cogn Sci 9:296–305
Martens S, Johnson A (2005) Timing attention: cuing target onset
interval attenuates the attentional blink. Mem Cogn 33:234–240
Miller EK (2000) The prefrontal cortex and cognitive control. Nat Rev
Neurosci 1:59–65
Miller BT, D’Esposito M (2005) Searching for “the top” in top-down
control. Neuron 48:535–538
Muller HJ, Rabbitt PMA (1989) ReXexive and voluntary orienting of
visual-attention—time course of activation and resistance to
interruption. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 15:315–330
Nakayama K, Mackeben M (1989) Sustained and transient compo-
nents of focal visual-attention. Vision Res 29:1631–1647
Nieuwenhuis S, Gilzenrat MS, Holmes BD, Cohen JD (2005) The role
of the locus coeruleus in mediating the attentional blink: a neuro-
computational theory. J Exp Psychol Gen 134:291–307
Nieuwenstein MR (2006) Top-down controlled, delayed selection in
the attentional blink. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform
32:973–985
Nieuwenstein MR, Chun MM, van der Lubbe RHJ, Hooge ITC (2005)
Delayed attentional engagement in the attentional blink. J Exp
Psychol Hum Percept Perform 31:1463–1475
Olivers CNL (2007) The time course of attention: it’s better than we
thought. Curr Dir Psychol Sci 16:11–15
Olivers CNL, van der Stigchel S, Hulleman J (2007) Spreading the
sparing: against a limited-capacity account of the attentional
blink. Psychol Res Psychol Forsch 71:126–139
Posner MI (1980) Orienting of attention. Q J Exp Psychol 32:3–25
Potter MC, Chun MM, Banks BS, Muckenhoupt M (1998) Two atten-
tional deWcits in serial target search: the visual attentional blink
and an amodal task-switch deWcit. J Exp Psychol Learn Mem
Cogn 24:979–992
Praamstra P, Boutsen L, Humphreys GW (2005) Frontoparietal control
of spatial attention and motor intention in human EEG. J Neuro-
physiol 94:764–774
Raymond JE, Shapiro KL, Arnell KM (1992) Temporary suppression
of visual processing in an RSVP task—an attentional blink. J Exp
Psychol Hum Percept Perform 18:849–860
Riggio L, Kirsner K (1997) The relationship between central cues and
peripheral cues in covert visual orientation. Percept Psychophys
59:885–899
Ristic J, Friesen CK, Kingstone A (2002) Are eyes special? it depends
on how you look at it. Psychon Bull Rev 9:507–513
Rounis E, Stephan KE, Lee L, Siebner HR, Pesenti A, Friston KJ,
Rothwell JC, Frackowiak RSJ (2006) Acute changes in frontopa-
rietal activity after repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation
over the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in a cued reaction time task.
J Neurosci 26:9629–9638
Shapiro KL, Raymond JE, Arnell KM (1994) Attention to visual pattern
information produces the attentional blink in rapid serial visual
presentation. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 20:357–371
Slagter HA, Kok A, Mol N, Talsma D, Kenemans JL (2005) Generat-
ing spatial and nonspatial attentional control: an ERP study. Psy-
chophysiology 42:428–439
Vossel S, Thiel CM, Fink GR (2006) Cue validity modulates the neural
correlates of covert endogenous orienting of attention in parietal
and frontal cortex. Neuroimage 32:1257–1264
Vul E, Nieuwenstein MR, Kanwisher N (2007) Temporal selection is
suppressed, delayed, and diVused during the attentional blink.
Psychol Sci (in press)
Ward R, Duncan J, Shapiro K (1996) The slow time-course of visual
attention. Cogn Psychol 30:79–109
Yantis S, Serences JT (2003) Cortical mechanisms of space-based and
object-based attentional control. Curr Opin Neurobiol 13:187–193123
